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Biometric Infrastructures and the




1 The Public Distribution System (PDS) is the main food security program in India, based
on the distribution of primary necessity goods at subsidized prices.1 Prompted by the
severe food shortages experienced in pre-independence India, the PDS is a nationwide
scheme articulated in two parts: firstly, essential commodities (primarily rice, wheat,
sugar, and kerosene)2 are procured by the central government from private producers
at below market prices, and secondly, these are redistributed through fair-price shops,
most commonly known as ration shops, throughout the nation. Organization of the PDS
is divided between the central government, which makes decisions on national food
policy  and  allocates  rationed  goods  to  the  states,  and  state  administrations,  which
design and implement distribution schemes at the local level.
2 The nation’s  dependency on food imports was high in pre-independence times,  but
significantly  reduced  following  the  Green  Revolution  in  the  early  and  mid-1960s.
Launched in 1965, the PDS was thus designed as a scheme for internal redistribution of
foodgrains, purchased from food-surplus regions and transferred to food-deficit ones at
affordable  prices.  However,  one  stream  of  scholarship  views  the  1990s  as  a  “lost
decade” in the improvement of national living standards, since economic growth was
not matched by proportional outcomes in poverty reduction (Sen and Himanshu 2004;
Himanshu 2007)3 and,  as exposed by the latest  round of  the National  Family Health
Survey (NFHS-4) conducted in 2015-16, India still struggles with achieving basic goals of
health and nutrition. 
3 Over  the  last  two  decades,  state-level  PDS  schemes  have  become  increasingly
computerized, especially in response to the issues of diversion to the private market
that  affect  the  program.  The  argument  supporting  end-to-end  digitization  of  anti-
poverty schemes in the name of  greater effectiveness has been applied to the PDS,
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generating local  systems that inscribe technology in diverse parts of  the program’s
supply  chain.  A  catalyst  for  such efforts  has  emerged in  the  form of  Aadhaar,  the
nationwide database which assigns a  unique biometric  and 12-digit  identifier  to  all
enrollees. With the passing of the Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies
Benefits and Services Act—most commonly known as the Aadhaar Bill—in March 2016,
the  integration  of  biometric  identification  into  anti-poverty  programs  was  legally
ratified and, as of the time of writing, has been introduced in multiple Indian states.
4 Based on nine-year research on the computerization of the PDS, this paper reflects on
the ongoing transformation experienced by the program and its effects through the
adoption  of  the  ecosystem  constituted  by  Jan  Dhan  Yojana,  Aadhaar  and  mobile
technologies—the “JAM Trinity”—that proposes to improve access to social benefits for
all.  Governmental  narratives  illustrate  the  proposed  transformation,  the
implementation of a new cash transfer system to eliminate distortions to the economy
and prevent diversion. It is argued that, while justified by solid anti-poverty objectives,
the biometric transformation of the PDS does not impede exclusion errors,  and the
transition to the cash transfer system has uncertain effects on recipients’ ability to
access social protection. Contributing to the debates on coded citizenship and social
policy in India, the paper reflects on the transformation that biometric infrastructures
induce in the PDS, and considers various measures for achieving greater inclusivity in
line with the National Food Security Act (NFSA) legislation.
5 This  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Following  a  synopsis  of  my  fieldwork  and
methodology, I detail the key phases in the history of the PDS, from pre-independence
times until the move from a universal to a targeted system in 1997. I then introduce the
issue of diversion, and the ways in which successive digital systems have sought to
address  its  shortcomings.  The  effects  of  digital  transformation  are  then  discussed
through insights from my research on Kerala and Karnataka, two states that moved to
an Aadhaar-based PDS after a history of back-end digitization. The discussion positions
the paper in the debates on coded citizenship and Indian social policy, and reviews
some alternatives for tailoring new technologies to ensure a more effective PDS.
 
Fieldwork and methodology 
6 My interest in the computerization of social protection schemes, of which the Indian
PDS is an example, began in 2010 with a preliminary study of the PDS in Kerala. Back
then the program was being augmented by a four-module software which facilitated
ration card release, allocation of foodgrains, monitoring of ration shops, and provided a
web  portal  through  which  relations  with  recipients  were  to  be  managed.  The
introduction  of  the  proposed  digital  transformation  of  a  large  anti-poverty
infrastructure  raised  conceptual  and  practical  issues  that  triggered  my  research
interest,  leading  me  to  investigate  the  state-level  digital  PDS  in  Kerala  and  its
implementation.  My  PhD  fieldwork,  conducted  in  2011-2012,  consisted  of  126
interviews  with  the  actors  of  the  Kerala  PDS,  observation  in  PDS  outlets,  and  live
demonstrations of the system already in operation at the National Informatics Centre
(NIC) in charge of the computerization (Masiero 2015, 2017).
7 Initially  developed  separately  from  anti-poverty  schemes  (Nilekani  and  Shah 2016),
over time the biometric infrastructure of Aadhaar became incorporated in the PDS of
several states, giving rise to the current, biometrically-enabled authentication system.
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This  had  implications  for  the  domains  of  program  architecture  and  recipients’
entitlements, which my research intended to reveal. For this reason, working in the
state of Karnataka which pioneered a state-level biometric system and then adopted an
Aadhaar-based  PDS,  I  conducted  two  more  rounds  of  fieldwork,  respectively  in
2014-2015 (on the state-level biometric system) and 2018-2019 (on the Aadhaar-enabled
one). This research, published in several works (Masiero and Prakash 2015; Prakash and
Masiero 2015; Masiero 2018; Masiero and Das 2019), is complemented by a systematic
review of cases of Aadhaar-based PDS in India based on secondary sources and aimed at
understanding the diversity of state-level experiences in which my primary findings
are contextualized.
8 I  adopt  a  qualitative-interpretive  method  of  enquiry  in  my  research.  Interpretive
research is  premised on the position that  our knowledge of  reality,  rather than an
appraisal  of  a  unique and objective truth,  is  a  social  construction by human actors
(Walsham 2006). This leads the researcher to appraise actors’ multiple interpretations
of the phenomena of interest, spending time in the field and tracing the history of the
subjective images that actors form of the events and processes they encounter. This
method,  termed  a  “historiography  of  images”  in  my  PhD  research  (Masiero 2014),
inspires my data collection and analysis, which is centered on respondent-led accounts
of  the  phenomena under  discussion  and triangulated  with  perspectives  from other
respondents,  observation  in  the  field  and  secondary  data  according  to  the  core
principles of interpretive research (Walsham 2006).
 
PDS: From Pre-Independence Rationing to Universal
Distribution
9 Mooij (1998) articulates the historical development of the PDS in three phases. In the
first phase (1939-1965) the original traits of the food distribution program emerged,
while  in  the  second  (1965-1990)  the  scheme  operated  under  a  universal  form
coordinated by the Food Corporation of India (FCI). In the third phase, beginning with
the Structural  Adjustment Programme of  1991,  the PDS became a targeted scheme,
reducing subsidies to households above the poverty line (APL) and, in certain states,
eliminating APL subsidies altogether.
10 India depended highly on foreign imports of foodgrain until 1939, when rationing was
introduced as an emergency measure in Bombay (Mooij 1998:79). It was from within a
scenario of lowered production of foodgrains per capita and high import reliance, in
tandem with a cessation of Burmese shipments of rice and wheat after its fall in April
1942,  that  war  erupted  (Mooij 1998:80).  Entitlement  failures,  combined  with  food
deficits at the local level, caused between 1.5 and 3 million deaths in the Bengal famine
of 1943 (Sen 1981). In his essay on the root causes of famines, Sen illustrates how the
colonial  machinery  and  the  pursuit  of  war  diverted  food  away  from  the  needy  by
prioritizing procurement for the ongoing conflict, precipitating a crisis of entitlements
rather than an effective shortage of food (Sen 1981:52–85).4 
11 As  Mooij (1998:80)  notes,  wartime  food-related  concerns  focused  especially  on
foodgrain prices, revealing the need for an effective mechanism for the centralization
of purchase and distribution of foodgrains. At the sixth Price Control Conference (1942)
a  Food  Department  was  created,  defining  the  core  functions  of  an  early-stage
distribution system which aimed to regulate prices and curb distributional issues in
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times  of  war.  The  Food Department  was  mandated  to  buy  foodgrains  from private
producers in provinces in which there was a surplus and allocate them to provinces in
which  there  was  a  deficit,  where  they  would  be  sold  below  market  price
(Mooij 1998:80).  Post-Independence,  the  Department  was  maintained  under  Nehru
although these years were again characterized by high reliance on food imports from
neighboring countries (Mooij 1998:81–84).
12 In 1965 the food security system took the shape of the PDS under the management of
the newly established FCI. As stated by the Foodgrain Prices Committee, the mandate of
the FCI was that of “enabling the government to undertake trading operations, through
which  it  will  influence  market  prices”  (Government  of  India  1968,  cited  in
Mooij 1998:84). The establishment of FCI gave rise to the universal PDS, a shape that the
program maintained until the early 1990s. The scheme’s operations took over the tasks
performed in the 1940s by the Food Department:  the FCI bought commodities from
private  producers,  stored  them in  warehouses  across  the nation,  and  redistributed
them through Authorized Wholesale Dealers (AWDs) from which ration shops collected
goods monthly.
13 From 1965 to 1990 the amount of foodgrains traded by the FCI increased from 10 to
more than 18 million tons, and the number of ration shops in the nation grew to over
350 thousand (Mooij 1998:86). The size of subsidy increased from 0.04 percent of GDP in
1970-1971  to  0.5  percent  in  1990-1991  (Ahluwalia 1993).  In  these  first  decades  of
existence, an important strength of the scheme was its network of ration shops which
offered a proximity to users, even in remote villages, and was aimed at making the
State a visible presence in poorer people’s lives.
14 At the same time, in these early phases implementation varied among different states.
While  subjected  to  central  government’s  general  policy  guidelines,  states  have
considerable power over PDS implementation, including the ability to set food subsidy
rates and distribution parameters in terms of benefits and beneficiaries. As a result,
despite the universality of PDS at the central level, some states elaborated pro-poor
schemes designed specifically for vulnerable groups. For example, in the Green Card
Scheme implemented  in  the  1980s  in  Karnataka,  40  percent  of  the  population  was
entitled to a “Green Card” which gave them the right to higher subsidies from the PDS
(Mooij 1998:87–8). In spite of this state-level targeting, at the national level, the system
remained universal and grounded on homogeneous prices.
 
PDS: Targeting and Its Consequences
15 In the 1990s the PDS was subjected to profound changes. The universality of the system
had exposed it to two major critiques: an urban bias was found in public distribution,
which  largely  excluded  rural  communities  from  the  system  (Howes  and  Jha 1992;
Dantwala 2006).5 Systemic  leakage  to  non-poor  recipients  also  caused  concerns  of
public expenditure, as providing a subsidy to all citizens incurred expenses that India,
facing a severe fiscal crisis, could not possibly sustain (Radhakrishna 1996; Dutta and
Ramaswami 2001;  Umali-Deininger  and  Deininger 2001;  Ramaswami  and
Balakrishnan 2002).
16 Reforms to the scheme, culminating in the adoption of a new targeted system in 1997,
were an integral part of the neoliberal reforms that India embarked upon in the early
1990s.  At  that  time  state  interventionism,  which  predominated  as  a  government
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philosophy in the first decades after Independence (Corbridge and Harriss 2000), was
contested due to the systemic economic and distributional inefficiencies attributed to it
(Radhakrishna and Subbarao 1997; Umali-Deininger and Deininger 2001). What was put
forward in its place was a form of neoliberal thought that framed the solution as two
concomitant actions: consistent reductions in public expenditure on social protection
on the one hand, and the introduction of open competition in the country’s economy
on  the  other  (Corbridge  and  Harriss 2000).  These  interventions  ascribed  to  the
philosophy of New Public Management, a style of government that fosters effectiveness
by  minimizing  the  role  of  the  state  and  adopting  incentives  proper  of  the  private
sector. 
17 As an integral part of its project of economic liberalization, in 1991 India embarked
upon a Structural Adjustment Programme, aimed at ending the ongoing fiscal crisis and
relaunching the economy through neoliberal reforms. At the core of the project was
the  view  of  markets  as  the  means  to  solve  the  inefficiencies  that  the  nation
experienced: the project saw the role of the state as a protector of property rights and
ultimately,  a  mere  guarantor  of  the  proper  functioning  of  markets  (Corbridge  and
Harriss 2000). The state was therefore induced to refrain from market interventions, to
limit  the  risk  of  systemic  inefficiencies  (Harvey 2005).  The  overarching  idea  of  a
neoliberal solution, which saw market openness as a key driver and state intervention
as a hurdle, characterized the India of the early 1990s, resulting in the restructuring of
systems of social assistance in ways that sought to maximize economic manageability.
18 The need for reduction in the national public expenditure, a direct prescription of the
Structural Adjustment Programme, had visible consequences on the management of
the PDS. Severe inefficiencies were substantiated in the point, made by World Bank
economists,  that  the  system  enabled  “meagre  transfer  at  exorbitant  cost”
(Radhakrishna  and  Subbarao 1997:7)  due  to  its  universal  nature,  while  fiscal
expenditures  were  reported  to  yield  long-term  distortions  on  private  markets
ultimately  hurting  the  poor  (Ramaswami  and  Balakrishnan 2002).  Such  concerns
became the root of the new targeted PDS, which converted universal provision into
reservation of subsidy to below-poverty-line (BPL) households.
19 This new PDS, introduced in the nation in June 1997, represented a changed rationale
behind which were two fundamental structural changes:
20 -  First,  the  program  shifted  away  from  universal  provision  to  channels  of  subsidy
distribution  restricted  to  the  BPL  category  while  providing  states  some  leeway  to
maintain a minimum subsidy for the APL.  A higher subsidy was introduced for the
poorest  of  the  poor,  classified  under  the  Antiyodaya  Anna  Yojana  (AAY)  scheme.
Qualification for both BPL and AAY categories was now determined in accordance with
periodically reviewed income-based poverty lines.
21 -  Second,  the  universal  PDS  had  allocated  goods  to  states  based  on  theoretical
requirement. In the targeted system, commodities began to be allocated on the basis of
relative state poverty: the central government prepares individual estimates of poverty
incidence  on each state,  and on the  basis  of  these  estimates supplies  of  goods  are
allocated proportionally (Tritah 2003).
22 To combat a structural drawback of the universal system, subsidies on essential goods
were reserved for the needy, in order to eliminate dispersal to the economically secure.
As a result of the targeted PDS, the central government’s fiscal subsidy expenditure was
effectively reduced (Umali-Deininger and Deininger 2001:328).  Another effect  of  this
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move was that APL citizens, left with little or no subsidy on PDS commodities, largely
opted out of the PDS and returned to purchasing essential goods on the free market. 
23 In the debate on social protection systems, one school of thought supports targeting as
it not only provides the means of reducing fiscal expenditure, but also an ability to cope
with the needs of a large poor and undernourished population. Another stream argues
the  targeted  PDS  does  not  successfully  avoid  exclusion  errors  leading  to  serious
disruptions  in  food  security  (e.g.  Swaminathan 2008;  Khera 2011a;  Sen and
Himanshu 2011; Drèze and Khera 2015). 
24 Among  the  nation’s  29  states,  the  experience  of  Kerala  is  a  clear  example  of  the
transition issues involved in the switch to  a  targeted PDS.  Before  1997,  Kerala  was
recognized as operating the best state-level PDS in India (Swaminathan 2002). Under
the  initial  universal  system  PDS  distribution  catered  to  97  percent  of  the  state’s
population  (George 1979:23)  and the  impact  on  beneficiaries’  nutritional  status  was
high and significant (Kumar 1979). However after the implementation of targeting in
1997, the state-level system endured three orders of entitlement access problems:
25 - As a result of centralized poverty assessments, allocation of foodgrains to the state
was  reduced  to  an  amount  lower  than  10  percent  of  the  pre-targeting  supply
(Swaminathan 2002:51). Poverty incidence in the state was estimated at just 25 percent,
significantly reducing allocation of goods to beneficiaries. The state government re-
estimated  poverty  from 25 percent  to  42  percent  of  the  population,  but  a  drop  in
available supplies still hindered entitlements.
26 - After 1997, households recognized as APL opted out the system in vast numbers, as a
result of the sharp reduction in subsidy reserved for them. This is reflected in data on
the overall offtake of cereals: as per Khera’s (2011b:107) estimates, statewide purchases
from the PDS dropped from 4.64 tons in 1997 to 1.71 tons in 2001. Kerala is one of the
states where a subsidy to the APL, while minimal, still exists at the present time, but
given its  comparatively  limited quantities many former beneficiaries  were  de  facto
excluded from it.
27 -  Following  the  sudden  shrink  of  the  customer  base,  many  ration  shops  became
unviable  and  closed  down (Krishnakumar 2000).  The  drastic  reduction  in  foodgrain
supplies, and the factual exclusion of the APL from purchases, created a situation in
which  ration  shops  were  made  unviable,  with  consequences  in  terms  of  debt  that
resulted in a wave of suicides among ration dealers (Suchitra 2004) and many ration
shops closing down.
28 As a consequence, direct or indirect, of those conditions listed above, PDS actors largely
engaged  in  illegal  sales  on  the  private  market,  where  standard  prices  are  higher
generating substantial profits for those who go undetected. Leakage of PDS goods on
the  private  market,  a  phenomenon  termed  “rice  mafia” by  the  Justice  Wadhwa
Committee  on PDS (2010),  undermines  the  viability  of  the  PDS and,  as  the  body of
scholars mentioned above points out, ultimately prevents exactly the food security that
the system is aimed at guaranteeing for all residents.
29 Systematic  leakage  constitutes  a  serious  issue  in  the  program  and  the  principal
disruption  to  its  normal  functioning  (Saini,  et  al 2017).  While  different  states  have
taken  different  measures  for  accountability  enforcement  over  time,  targeting  has
reduced the customer base of ration shops, which are left in dire need of new resources
for  business  continuation.  Khera’s (2011a:1058)  note  that  “corruption has  become a
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requirement  of  economic  survival  for  the  PDS  dealers”  constitutes  a  first-order
problem in the PDS, undermining its ability to effectively serve its beneficiaries.
 
PDS Computerization: From State-Level Systems to
Aadhaar
30 The PDS is an integral part of national social policy, but operates at the state level. The
central  government,  which  is  in  charge  of  policy  formulation,  makes  decisions  on
procurement  and  allocation  based  on  state  population  and  relative  shares  of  BPL
households (Tritah 2003:5). State governments implement and manage the PDS, making
decisions on crucial factors such as offtake, the location of ration shops, and the list of
goods  provided  through  the  program  (Tritah 2003:6).  While  the  issue  price  is
determined centrally,  state governments are allowed to modify it  as a result of the
additional costs of stock and delivery (Tritah 2003:6), and are in charge of operational
decisions on program management to facilitate delivery and combat diversion at the
sub-national level (Khera 2011b).
31 Several states have been early adopters of PDS computerization, initially implemented
as a measure configured to fix the multiple crises induced by targeting. In Kerala the
PDS was digitized across three different phases: the first consisted in the creation of a
digital  database,  stored  at  the  level  of  taluks (sub-district  administrative  units),  in
which details of all users of the PDS were registered. The second coincided with the
implementation of a software package automatizing the key functions of PDS in Taluk
Supply Offices (TSOs), the offices in charge of the local administration of the program.
The  third  phase,  started  with  a  pilot  scheme  in  2012,  consists  of  integrating  the
distribution system with Aadhaar—India’s biometric population database. This scheme
allowed  PDS  users  to  obtain  their  entitlements  from  ration  shops  using  a  secure
identification system. 
32 The experience of Kerala is paradigmatic of that of other states such as Chhattisgarh,
Gujarat  and Karnataka which embarked on early  forms of  computerization of  their
PDS'. In Chhattisgarh, priority was given to computerization of the back-end phases of
the PDS and a tracking system was built to control diversion in the early stages of the
supply chain (Rajan, Chopra, Somashekar and Laux 2016).  In Gujarat and Karnataka,
biometric  identification  was  implemented  in  ration  shops  even  prior  to  Aadhaar
seeding, to guarantee the authenticity of users’ entitlement and combat ration dealers’
malpractice.  The  Aadhaar  system,  launched  in  2009,  provided  a  common  national
matrix to underpin efforts of biometric identification.
33 In January 2009 the Government of India set up the Unique Identification Authority of
India (UIDAI)  to  collect  the biometric  data of  all  residents,  store them in a  central
database,  and  give  each  enrollee  a  unique  12-digit  number.  In  June  2009,  Nandan
Nilekani  (the  co-founder  of  Infosys,  a  large  technology  services  enterprise)  was
appointed as the first head of UIDAI, which was established as an office of the Planning
Commission  of  the Central  Government.  Starting  from  2010,  Aadhaar  enrolment
centers were set up across the nation and state governments led proactive campaigns
to increase their residents’ adherence to the scheme. The National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) government has supported continuation of the scheme, which originated under
the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, and especially fostered its
inscription  in  the  social  protection  system designed  to  serve  the  poor  (Bhatia  and
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Bhabha 2017).  This  makes Aadhaar an integral  part  of  India’s  social  policy,  and the
government’s strategy openly incorporates it in the fight to work against the leakage
that affects the PDS (Government of India 2015).  In August 2019 89.2 percent of the
population had an Aadhaar number assigned, and high enrolment rates were achieved
even in India’s poorest states.6 With more than 1.2 billion numbers issued to residents,
Aadhaar is now the biggest biometric database in the world, explicitly linked to the
provision of public services and social welfare.7 
34 Effective incorporation of Aadhaar in the PDS started in 2011-2012, with pilot projects
undertaken  at  the  local  level  in  different  states  (Saini  et  al. 2017).  These  projects
introduced Aadhaar recognition in the ration shop space that constitutes the last mile
of the supply chain. In the East Godavari district of Andhra Pradesh, one of the first in
the country to  pilot  the  scheme,  PDS beneficiaries  were requested to  register  with
Aadhaar  and  their  identification  number  was  linked  with  the  ration  card  database
which reported on their poverty status.  Ration shops were endowed with biometric
point-of-sale machines set to recognize beneficiaries through their fingerprint, hence
delivering the exact monthly allotment to which each user was entitled.
35 State-level instances of Aadhaar-based PDS were justified with the establishment of a
two-fold  accountability  mechanism  aimed  at  guaranteeing  the  entitlement  of
beneficiaries and simultaneously,  preventing ration dealers from engaging in illegal
sales. These schemes were initially confined to the stage of pilot projects, as a Supreme
Court order in September 2013 prohibited making Aadhaar a mandatory requirement
for access to anti-poverty programs. Public debate centered on the extent to which
enrolment was effectively non-coercive, given the increasing entrenchment of Aadhaar
authentication in the large majority of public services. In August 2015, a new Supreme
Court order made it possible for states to use Aadhaar in their PDS schemes. 
36 In March 2016, the Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and
Services Act was passed in Parliament, providing legal backing to the incorporation of
Aadhaar in state-level PDS implementations. Criticism emerged around the governing
coalition’s choice to pass the act as a Money Bill,  a legislative act which is directly
enforced once passed in the Lower House without sanctioning by the Upper House of
Parliament.  Finding its  origins  in the National  Identification Authority  of  India  Bill
passed in 2010,  the Aadhaar Bill  enabled states to include Aadhaar identification in
their social protection schemes, and thus state-level PDS implementations to become
officially Aadhaar-based. As it afforded a formal shift to biometrics in anti-poverty core
programs,  the Bill  is  viewed as the final  act  of  incorporating Aadhaar in the social
protection system. 
37 Interwoven with the debate on social  protection, there are growing concerns about
Aadhaar’s  affordances  in  developing  a  surveillance  state,  in  which  private  parties
would access UIDAI data without reliable controls (Rao and Nair 2019:477). Addressing
such preoccupations,  the Supreme Court emitted a final verdict in September 2018,
declaring Aadhaar’s  constitutionality  in  the light  of  its  role  in  strengthening social
welfare.  The  verdict  directly  connects  Aadhaar  to  its  affordances  in  public  welfare
delivery, and for the same reason it limits its use by private parties with commercial
purposes  (Rao and  Nair 2019:477).  In  continuity  with  the  Aadhaar  bill,  the  verdict
frames digital identification into the functional role of enabler of public services, hence
backing the continued entrenchment on Aadhaar in national social protection schemes.
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The Aadhaar-Based PDS: Effects on Entitlements
38 Based on the experiences of Kerala and Karnataka, two states that adopted an Aadhaar-
based  PDS  after  an  earlier  history  of  digitization,  the  transition  to  biometric
recognition has yielded a set of seemingly positive short-term effects, three of which
have  emerged  from  my  research:  reduced  ration  dealer  incentive  to  corruption,
strengthened leakage controls,  and the  affordance  (still  not  actualized)  of  enabling
recipients to opt out of the ration shop they are registered with, upon suspicion of
diversion by the ration dealer. The three types of effects are illustrated below.
39 First, an Aadhaar-based PDS reduces the incentive for ration dealers to sell goods on
the  market  instead  of  targeting  genuinely  entitled  recipients.  The  mechanism
underlying this is grounded on how, enabling secure identification of beneficiaries, a
biometric system tackles the problem of fake transaction records, which—as data from
both  states  reveal—were  used  by  ration  dealers  to  hide  the  conduct  of  illegal
transactions  on  private  markets  (Masiero 2015;  Prakash  and  Masiero 2015).  Fake
transactions,  normally  justified  through bogus  ration card numbers,  allowed ration
dealers to claim having sold to entitled recipients at PDS prices, while selling on private
markets and generating illicit profits. The Aadhaar infrastructure verifies identification
through biometrics: the invention of non-existing customers thus becomes difficult to
enact, diminishing the opportunity for corruption of the system by ration dealers.
40 Second,  controls  on  leakage  are  strengthened  as  the  Aadhaar-verified  identity  of
customers is used to monitor the offtake of goods from ration shops. Beyond checking
the identity of buyers, point-of-sale machines register the amount of commodities sold
at every transaction: all sales of PDS goods are thus recorded in a dedicated database,
further  reducing  ration  dealers’  ability  to  invent  sales  that  have  not  occurred  in
practice. In addition, the system allows verification that sold quantities match those
received by ration shops after monthly allocation, making it difficult for ration dealers
to claim “running out” of goods and then divert them to the market. This mechanism
complements the control on bogus ration cards, especially given that ration dealers
cannot register for fresh ration stocks until the quantity for a given month has been
completely disbursed.
41 A third mechanism, acting on the demand side, proposes to delink ration shops from
the households registered with each of them. Every household was originally linked to
one ration shop, and hence able to buy PDS goods only from it. As a result, even if
customers  become aware of  ration dealer  misbehavior  (most  frequently  enacted by
underselling or claiming “running out” of  goods),  they have no option to purchase
from a  different  dealer.  Aadhaar-based point-of-sale  machines,  however,  afford  the
possibility  to  recognize  all  residents  registered  with  the  system,  hence  enabling  a
“portable” PDS in which purchases could be made from any ration shop. While this “
delinking” has not yet occurred, the technology is designed and implemented in such a
way to enable it, and a system operating in this way would enable recipients to opt out
of ration shops indulging in illicit behavior.
42 Proponents  of  the  system  argue  that  the  combination  of  reduction  in  corruption
incentives,  controls on  diversion,  and delinking  users  from ration  shops  makes  an
Aadhaar-based PDS more effective and accountable, reducing the inclusion errors that
affect the system as a whole (Gulati and Saini 2015; Saini et al. 2017). Inclusion errors
occur when a targeted system erroneously includes non-entitled beneficiaries, such as
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agents  in  the  private  markets  or  owners  of  bogus  ration  cards.  Technology-based
interventions on state-level PDS have already shown their effectiveness especially in
Chhattisgarh,  where  an  automatized  system  (COREPDS)  has  been  instrumental  to
program improvement, offering an alternative to Aadhaar that creates new forms of
back-end monitoring and reduces estimated diversion (Rajan et al. 2016; Khera 2018). In
Kerala,  where  post-targeting  problems  had  been  significant,  computerization  has
improved the ability to allocate goods at the ration shop level and monitor offtake from
the program (Masiero 2015). 
43 As I have argued elsewhere (Masiero 2017) however, experiences of Aadhaar-based PDS
are just a component of the grand design of change behind the scheme. Understanding
such design requires attention to a composite infrastructure, first announced in the
Economic  Survey  2014-2015,  in  which  Aadhaar  is  combined  with  two  more
technologies:  a  financial  inclusion  program  (the  Pradhan  Mantri  Jan  Dhan  Yojana,
commonly  referred  to  simply  as  Jan  Dhan  Yojana),  and  mobile  phones,  whose
ownership  by  vulnerable  segments  of  the  population  has  increased  over  the  last
decades. A flagship scheme of the NDA government, Jan Dhan Yojana aims at providing
lower-income households with a bank account, which will constitute the backbone core
infrastructure for the direct transfer of benefits to those entitled. The program was
launched in 2015 and led to the opening of millions of zero-balance bank accounts for
BPL households, in an effort towards financial inclusion of marginalized communities
(Kaur and Singh 2015).
44 The combination of Jan Dhan Yojana, Aadhaar and mobile payments, acronymized as
“JAM  trinity”  in  the  current  governments’  narrative,  is  planned  with  the  explicit
purpose of rebuilding the nation’s anti-poverty system by converting existing subsidies
into a lump-sum transfer to the BPL (Government of India 2015:64).  The concept of
financialization, used in development studies to refer to the increased use of financial
instruments  in  development  policy  (Young 2010),  powerfully  captures  the  rationale
behind the JAM ecosystem. Behind it is the idea that in-kind subsidies, while widely
deployed as a means to anti-poverty policy, do not constitute an ideal solution for the
delivery of  social  protection schemes,  as  they suffer  from multiple  issues (they are
identified in the Economic Survey 2014-2015 as being regressive, distorting the market
in ways that harm the poor, and being prone to leakage and diversion). As a result,
development policies based on novel  financial  instruments are encouraged whether
developed  from  scratch  or  on  top  of  previously  constructed  development  schemes
infrastructures.
45 Importantly  in  this  context,  the  implementation  of  the  JAM  trinity  has  precise
implications for the future of the PDS and India’s social protection at large. At present,
various states are engaging in the move to Aadhaar-based systems, where biometric
infrastructures  are  built  into  the  program  as  it  was.  As  specified  in  the  Economic
Survey 2014-2015, the JAM trinity serves instead to prepare a move to a new scheme of
direct transfers, transforming food rations into transfers of cash direct to beneficiaries’
bank accounts (Government of India 2015:64–65). As reported by the Survey, the new
scheme serves to eliminate PDS leakages and the distortions induced by subsidies.
46 The  shift  from  PDS  to  cash  transfers  has  already  been  piloted  in  Pondicherry,
Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli,8 and is at the center of debate in Indian social
policy (e.g. Svedberg 2012; Khera 2014; Chanchani 2017). Advocates of the policy shift
point to the structural ineffectiveness of the PDS, arguing that leakages and distortions
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brought  in  by  state  subsidies  need  elimination  at  the  roots,  but  a  growing  set  of
narratives has emerged in opposition to this, raising concerns with Aadhaar-based PDS
and the JAM trinity alike. In my research on the PDS through the years, three core
problems have emerged: these revolve around technical fragilities, the persistence of
exclusion  errors,  and  the  shift  in  food  governance  structures  determined  by  the
passage from the PDS to a market-led system.
47 Technical fragilities emerge from project complexities, specifically implementation of
diverse infrastructures to automatize monitoring of sales and offtake. The problem of
technical fragility emerged with particular visibility early in the Aadhaar-based PDS
adoption process and affected multiple states in the nation, for instance in Rajasthan
there  were  violent  demonstrations  and  cases  of  vandalism  of  ration  shop  POS
machines, motivated by people’s frustration with the malfunctions of the new system.9
The  problem  induced  by  technical  fragilities  is  powerfully  summarized  by  the
economist Jean Drèze:
This system requires multiple fragile technologies to work at the same time:
the PoS machine,  the biometrics,  the internet connection,  remote servers
and  often  other  elements  such  as  the  local  mobile  network.  Further,  it
requires  at  least  some  household  members  to  have  an  Aadhaar  number,
correctly seeded in the PDS database (cited in Shagun and Aditi 2016).
Infrastructural  complexity leads to system malfunctions registered in diverse states
and regions and casting doubt on claims of Aadhaar-based PDS effectiveness (Drèze and
Khera 2017).  Malfunctions  run  the  risk  of  exacerbating  exclusion  errors.  This  is
identified as the main problem brought by the PDS transformation to a targeted system
(Swaminathan 2008; Khera 2011a). The term “exclusion errors” refers to problems that
lead  genuinely  needful  households  to  be  excluded  from  targeted  programs  due  to
erroneous  categorization  of  their  status  or  ineffective  delivery  mechanisms
(Tritah 2003). If users are not recognized from the front-end interface of the biometric
PDS,  the risk is  that of  exclusion from access to food rations,  an outcome that has
already been noted in biometrically enabled systems across the nation (Masiero and
Prakash 2015; Drèze and Khera 2017).
48 Some commentators classify such problems as transitory rather than structural, since
they pertain to technological implementation and not to the structural properties (i.e.
the intrinsic technological features) of the new system. If technological improvements
were sufficient,  few issues would remain in the program, such as the limited profit
margins  of  ration  dealers—resulting  in  continuation  of  incentives  to  corruption.
Supporters argue issues of this type are a legacy of the shift to a targeted system, and
may persist in spite of the checks introduced by the new technology. Proponents of the
new direct transfer benefit policy argue that a shift to a cash transfer system would
eliminate the roots of the problem, since ration shops could be eliminated (Saini et
al. 2017).
49 What remains problematic, however, is the change in food governance that this entails,
which has been problematized by bureaucrats and PDS users alike. As in the early days
of  its  implementation,  the  PDS  is  managed  by  state  governments  and  run  by
bureaucracies  that,  despite  the  multiple  issues  illustrated  above,  are  familiar  to
recipients of the program. A move to cash transfers would radically change existing
governance structures, shifting control from state bureaucracies to markets in which
recipients would purchase their goods. While the move is justified by the purpose of
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elimination  of  leakages  and  distortion,  commentators  observe  that  the  transition
entails exasperation of the risk of exclusion errors, which might endanger the greater
effectiveness brought about by reforms (Drèze and Khera 2017; Chanchani 2017).
50 These  observations  are  reflected  in  my  latest  study  of  the  Aadhaar-based  PDS  in
Karnataka (Masiero and Das 2019). To our question of whether they would welcome a
transition from the current  in-kind subsidies  to  cash transfers,  recipients  provided
quasi-unanimous negative responses,  motivated by three main reasons.  Firstly,  PDS
beneficiaries place high value on the perceived security of material rations, which is
not  seen  as  guaranteed  in  the  case  of  replacement  with  a  monthly  sum  of  cash.
Secondly,  the trusted routine of  monthly visits  to the ration shops is  portrayed by
respondents as a highly valued practice, relied upon as means to ensure a safe ration of
basic-need goods for the household.10 Third, a minority of respondents have pointed
out issues of unequal access to finances within the house, displaying the concern that
male household members may divert cash benefits away from their purpose. While all
these reasons to prefer food to cash were put forward, recipients displayed limited
awareness of the purposeful link between the Aadhaar-based PDS and the objective to
shift to a system of direct benefits constructed through the JAM trinity.
51 To  sum  up,  the  history  of  the  Aadhaar-based  PDS  recounted  here  reveals  the
transformative power that biometric technologies, reconstructing the last mile of the
scheme’s supply chain, yield on anti-poverty programs. If not inscribed in its policy
context,  such  transformation  may  be  seen  as  an  incremental  fix,  consisting  in  the
provision of biometric security to combat the issue of market diversion. But the policy
intention behind it, that of transitioning to a cash transfer system that eliminates the
distortions and opportunities for leakage brought about by subsidy, marks a radical
change  in  the  program’s  architecture,  whose  ability  of  enacting  effective  pro-poor
structures remains to be assessed. Viewed in this light, the biometric reconstruction of
the PDS constitutes a political transformation that will have substantial consequences
on the entitlements of program recipients.
 
Discussion
52 This section positions the argument on biometrically-induced transformation of the
PDS into two streams of  literature,  one of  which pertains to  coded citizenship and
especially to the debate on datafication of anti-poverty programs within it. The second
stream is centered on Indian social policy and on the need to find ways to combat the
exclusion errors that persist in spite of the biometric transformation of the scheme
(Drèze and Khera 2017; Khera 2019).
 
Coded Citizenship: Datafication of Anti-Poverty Programs 
53 The notion of coded citizenship refers to the transformation of populations into data,
as  a  result  of  which the citizen becomes machine-readable  as  an ensemble  of  data
(Srinivasan and Johri 2014). This concept is increasingly interpreted as the datafication
of  populations  (Rao  and  Nair 2019),  and  seen  in  historical  continuity  with  the
technologies of rule used to administer subjects in colonial times. The lens of citizen-
state relations is widely used to study India’s Aadhaar, both as a top-down means of
control  and  surveillance  and  as  an  infrastructure  through  which  India’s  residents
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access the state (cf.  Bhatia and Bhabha 2017; Chaudhuri and König 2018; Hosein and
Whitley 2019; Singh 2019; Rao 2019; Nair 2019). Viewing the incorporation of Aadhaar
as the latest phase of a longer process of PDS computerization, my research presents
some reflections for this debate.
54 First, as a datafier of the population of Indian residents, Aadhaar converts individual
recipients of programs such as the PDS into machine-readable data. By its own nature,
this process allows the automatization of two functions of the scheme: the recognition
of entitled vs. non-entitled users and the assignation of entitlements according to data
(Masiero and Das 2019).  While the same functions were present in the manual PDS,
Aadhaar makes them data-mediated in ways that change not only the architecture of
the program, but also recipients’ ways to access their entitlements. This leads to the
point  that  datafication acquires  a  particular  meaning  when related  to  anti-poverty
schemes, which opens a new area of enquiry—here termed the datafication of anti-
poverty  programs—centered  specifically  on  the  effects  of  data  on  program
architectures and recipients’ entitlements.
55 Secondly, the work presented here subscribes to the stream which considers Aadhaar
in relation to how residents see the state (Chaudhuri  and König 2018;  Rao 2019).  In
particular, my data suggest that citizens “form an image” of the state that is directly
mediated by technology, which hence should be studied through the direct encounters
of PDS recipients with it (Masiero 2017). The volume of Aadhaar ethnographies edited
by  Rao  and  Nair (2019)  focuses  specifically  on  such  encounters,  offering  multiple
perspectives on how these are embedded in the lives of residents. This suggests that, in
studying  datafied  anti-poverty  programs,  it  is  important  to  combine  studies  of
infrastructural  power  (such  as,  for  example,  the  designers’  perspective  offered  by
Singh 2019) with the study of local-level encounters, through the technology-mediated
spaces in which the citizen encounters the state.
56 In  addition,  the  concept  of  data  justice—recent  but  prominent  in  the  literature  of
datafication—proves useful in exploring cases of datafied schemes such as the Aadhaar-
mediated PDS. The object of a recent debate (Dencik et al. 2019), the notion of data
justice indicates “fairness in the way people are made visible, represented and treated
as a result of their production of digital data” (Taylor 2017:1). Literature on data justice
investigates representations of people in a datafied world, addressing issues of fairness
and security which have global  relevance (Dencik et  al. 2019);  issues which are still
particularly relevant in the Global South in the light of datafied anti-poverty schemes
and of the structural drivers that influence the condition of the world’s poor (Heeks
and Renken 2018).
57 Quoting Masiero and Das (2019), the data presented in my research of the Aadhaar-
based PDS reveal three limitations to the enactment of data justice in datafied anti-
poverty programs. A first limitation, of a legal nature, shows how the Aadhaar-based
PDS—while remaining within the boundaries of  constitutionality—confines access to
enrolled  residents,  effectively  subordinating  the  right-to-food  to  registration  in  a
biometric identification scheme. This echoes the point by Ramanathan (2014) that the
poor have no choice when it comes to enrolment as in the new scheme registration is
an essential requirement for receiving any form of social protection. While advocates
maintain  that  welfare  objectives  justify  the  conditionality  of  social  protection  to
registration, fieldwork shows a lacuna for those recipients for whom lack of biometric
recognition is a cause for denial of rations.
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58 Two more limitations to  data justice  emerge from the research,  whose natures  are
respectively design-related and informational (Masiero and Das 2019). A design-related
limit relates to the finding that the Aadhaar-based PDS focuses on inclusion errors,
while biometric recognition technology leaves exclusion errors unattended. In terms of
the  informational  aspect,  the  limitation  lies  in  the  incompleteness  of  information
received by PDS beneficiaries on the transformative goal of Aadhaar. In contrast, this
goal  which  is  mirrored  by  the  very  structure  and  enactment  of  the  JAM  trinity
technologies is clear in the Economic Survey 2014-2015, the report with which the JAM
trinity was launched:
(…) the JAM Number Trinity can be seamlessly linked, and all subsidies rolled
into one or a few monthly transfers, real progress in terms of direct income
support  to  the  poor  may finally  be  possible.  The  heady  prospect  for  the
Indian  economy  is  that,  with  strong  investments  in  state  capacity,  that
Nirvana today seems within reach. It will be a Nirvana for two reasons: the
poor will be protected and provided for; and many prices in India will be
liberated  to  perform  their  role  of  efficiently  allocating  resources  in  the
economy and boosting long run growth. (Government of India 2015:65).
When talking to PDS users however, this broader goal has very seldom been brought up
by interviewees, while Aadhaar is mostly considered in the context of encounters with
it—in the ration shops where the PDS is accessed—and therefore, as an instrument for
improvement of the PDS rather than for enactment of broader change. Conversely, the
underlying JAM trinity goal of moving from subsidies to a cash transfers system does
not appear in conversations with beneficiaries, whose attitudes towards such a move,
as it emerges from interviews, are generally suspicious. These limits to data justice,
seen  in  a  case  of  datafication  of  a  large  social  protection  system,  require  further
research in the domain of datafication of anti-poverty programs.
59 Finally, a limitation lies in the lens this research has adopted. Citizen-state relations
surely offer a lens through which to read the Aadhaar case, and it does make sense to
use such a lens in a case in which Aadhaar mediates a state-led program such as the
PDS. Yet other researchers, for example Solanki (2019), warn about the limitations of
the  citizen-state  lens,  which  does  not  contemplate  many  aspects—such  as  intra-
bureaucratic relations—that should be discussed in a program which regulates people’s
lives  not  only as  citizens but  also as  workers and consumers.  While  limited by the
Supreme  Court  verdict  of  2018,  the  ubiquity  of  Aadhaar  invites  us  to  consider
perspectives that look beyond the sheer domain of the state-citizen relation.
 
Social Policy: Combating the Exclusion Error
60 In  the  aftermath  of  the  Aadhaar  Bill  and  of  the  Supreme  Court  verdict  on  the
constitutionality  of  the  program,  the  Aadhaar-based  transformation  of  social
protection schemes has been at the center of the Indian social policy debate. As shown
in this paper, over the last decade the PDS has been profoundly transformed by digital
and biometric technologies. Technological transformation, coupled with the constant
need for secure social protection for the Indian poor, calls for reflection on how state-
level computerized PDS can combat the exclusion errors that persist in it. This is in line
with  the  NFSA goal  to  provide  PDS  foodgrains  to  around two  thirds  of  the  Indian
population, and three core considerations emerge from my research.
Biometric Infrastructures and the Indian Public Distribution System
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 23 | 2020
14
61 First,  as  observed  over  time  in  both  fieldwork  states,  it  is  important  to  design
technologies that involve the early stages of the PDS supply chain. In particular, digital
systems of allocation and monitoring play a major role in tackling issues of diversion
that occur before goods reach the ration shops. By doing so they tackle the crucial node
of  diversion,  since  substantial  portions  of  leakage  occur  during  the  important,  but
under monitored stages of transportation and storage (Khera 2011b).  While political
appeal  of  front-end technologies  is  comparatively  greater,  back-end systems are  of
fundamental  importance  in  restructuring  the  PDS,  and  they  play  a  major  role  in
extending the actual coverage of the program. 
62 Second, technology has a role in combating the root causes of diversion, including the
pressures for ration dealers to find secure sources of income after the crisis induced by
targeting. In the aftermath of the shift to a targeted system, some states have resorted
to credit concessions to ration dealers (Swaminathan 2008), while others have allowed
sales of non-PDS commodities in ration shops to ensure business continuity. Others,
however, have used technology to ensure that all ration shops receive their theoretical
requirement  and  are  enabled  to  conduct  business.  If  technology  can  be  used  to
strengthen the PDS in its current form, this suggests that there are alternatives to
dismantling  the  system in  favor  of  direct  transfers,  and  the  use  of  technology  for
strengthening  the  existing  PDS  should  be  compared  and  contrasted  with  that
possibility (Masiero 2015; Khera 2017).
63 A  recent  study  by  Allu,  Deo  and  Devalkar (2019)  offers  a  thorough  review  of  the
alternatives to Aadhaar-based biometrics in the PDS. The authors propose a taxonomy
of  methods  along  three  dimensions:  “mode  of  authentication,  biometric  or  non-
biometric,  source of authentication, central database connected through internet or
locally stored data in the point of sale device (ePoS), frequency of authentication, at
every transaction or  once for  a  predefined number of  transactions” (Allu,  Deo and
Devalkar 2019:2). Based on the experience of digitized PDS in eight different states, the
authors  observe  how  most  benefits  in  performance  are  associated  with  the  use  of
biometrics during registration, while biometric authentication at ration shops is not
systematically associated to more effective systems. In the light of these results, it is
important that states evaluate different alternatives before scaling up Aadhaar-based
identification to all their ration shops.
64 In  another  study,  Khera  (2018)  observes  that  other  options  than  Aadhaar
authentication at the ration shop are available to monitor PDS leakage. She reviews two
different options: in Chhattisgarh’s COREPDS experiment, which began in 2012, ration
shop transactions were enabled by smart cards with an embedded memory chip, hence
every transaction was recorded on the chip and uploaded online. In Tamil Nadu, QR-
coded smart cards maintain a digital trail of all transactions, using a smart card reader
in the ration shop—in lieu of the Aadhaar-enabled point of sale machine. Comparing
these two alternatives to Aadhaar-based biometric authentication, Khera highlights the
significant advantages of such alternatives, observing that smart cards—be them QR-
coded, or with embedded memory chips—offer substantial advantages, also enabling
immobile  persons  (such  as  the  elderly)  to  rely  on  other  persons  to  fetch  PDS
commodities.
65 Finally,  as  a  consequence  of  the  need to  minimize  exclusion errors,  the  state-level
experiences reviewed here highlight the importance of backup mechanisms for user
recognition.  There  is  a  particularly  pressing  need  for  measures  of  this  type,  since
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disempowerment caused by user exclusion compensates the theoretical benefits that
computerization  may  bring.  In  an  earlier  study  of  Karnataka  (Masiero  and
Prakash 2015) it had emerged that, in a limited number of ration shops, ration dealers
resorted to paper-based records of transactions to bypass the point-of-sale machine in
case of malfunctioning. This was, however, not the case when we returned to the field
in 2018. More encompassing mechanisms of redressal are needed, especially after the
Aadhaar  Bill  enabled  state-level  systems  to  become  entirely  Aadhaar-based.  While
enrolment  is  now  very  high  among  Indian  residents,  failure  of  Aadhaar-based
authentication still occurs, and to effectively ensure the right to food to it needs to be
integrated with alternative forms of authentication or state-level databases.
 
Conclusion 
66 From  the  research  on  computerization  of  the  PDS  presented  here,  two  final
considerations can be drawn on the relation between technology developments and
social welfare systems. Firstly, the hegemonic narrative on technology-induced leaps in
the effectiveness of social protection systems is problematized by the considerations
offered here. What we witness in the biometric PDS is a history of winners and losers,
which juxtaposes reform with problems of exclusion, technological malfunctioning and
undesired shifts in the making of program governance. While digital tools may well be
entrenched in program improvement, technical errors related to access entitlement
and  data  injustices may  become  equally  pervasive,  and  prevent  the  system  from
achieving the goals of effective coverage that were established for it.
67 Secondly,  the  JAM  trinity-enabled  move  from  PDS  to  cash  transfers  needs  careful
evaluation to avoid exacerbation of the exclusion errors that already affect the system.
While such transition is still under discussion, its risks and benefits should be balanced
against those of technologies that preserve the existing PDS instead of dismantling it.
State-level  stories  of  PDS  reform lead  to  the  argument  that  an  alternative  to  cash
transfers is possible, and would avoid the major costs and disruption that transition to
the new system would entail, even if implemented and phased in gradually across the
nation. Hence, alternative options need to be evaluated, in the light of the ability of
each proposed solution to provide secure entitlements to PDS recipients.
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NOTES
1. Sections of this manuscript have been adapted from my unpublished doctoral dissertation
(Masiero 2014).
2. In this paper I refer to the PDS as a food security program because, although non-food items
(e.g. kerosene) are also subsidised under the program, the scheme has the primary purpose of
guaranteeing adequate nutrition to all Indian citizens. “Foodgrains”—primarily rice and wheat—
is the staple commodity in the scheme, and the term is often used to refer to PDS subsidised
commodities at large.
3. Other scholars (Deaton 2003; Sundaram and Tendulkar 2003) claim that poverty decline in the
1990s  has  proceeded in  line  with earlier  trends.  This  is  based on controversy over  different
interpretations of data from the 61st round of the National Sample Survey (NSS).
4. The literature ascribes famines in colonial India to a combination of natural causes, such as
mismatches  between demand and supply  induced primarily  by  crop failures,  and man-made
causes,  notably  political  action  that  has  adverse  effects  on  redistribution  (Roy 2016:2).  See
Bhatia (1991) for an in-depth historiography of famines in precolonial and colonial times and
Roy (2016) for a review of theories regarding their relative causes.
5. The  existence  of  the  urban  bias  is,  however,  questioned  by  several  studies  (e.g. Dev  and
Suryanarayana 1991; Suryanarayana 1995) on the grounds that different measurements lead to
different distributional outcomes.
6. Retrieved November 15, 2019 (https://uidai.gov.in/about-uidai.html).
7. Retrieved November 15, 2019 (https://uidai.gov.in/images/state-wise-aadhaar-saturation.pdf).
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8. Retrieved November 18, 2019 (http://www.livemint.com/Politics/BfeNi5AreTn1cJ8ROIzxXM/
NDA-kicks-off-PDS-reforms.html).
9. Retrieved  November  18,  2019  (https://scroll.in/article/805909/in-rajasthan-there-is-unrest-
at-the-ration-shop-because-of-error-ridden-aadhaar).
10. This might, however, be a consequence of the general good functioning of PDS in Karnataka,
which performs better than most Indian states on PDS offtake (Khera 2011b). While we have not
surveyed states which lag behind on PDS performance, it is possible that such states may display
lower reliance of users on ration shops.
ABSTRACTS
This paper reflects on the author’s nine-year research on the transformation of India’s Public
Distribution System (PDS) enacted through digital technologies first and, more recently, through
Aadhaar’s  biometric  infrastructure.  Based  on  the  experiences  of  two  states,  Kerala  and
Karnataka, which adopted biometric identification in their ration shops, the paper illustrates the
effects of the transition to an Aadhaar-based PDS, on both program governance and recipients’
entitlements.  It  argues  that,  while  designed  with  the  objective  of  combating  the  rice  mafia
resulting  in  foodgrain  diversion,  a  biometric  PDS  does  not  prevent  the  exclusion  errors
pervading  the  program,  and  supports  the  transition  to  a  cash  transfer  system  whose
developmental outcomes are still uncertain. Contributing to the debate on coded citizenship in
South Asia, this paper reflects on the transformative power that biometric infrastructures yield
over food security schemes, and considers different ways a computerized PDS may be tailored for
the inclusion of vulnerable groups.
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